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By John Ross
[The author is a freelance journalist who has written on Mexican political and economic affairs for
many years.]
Elections in 20 Mexican states this year were conducted under the shadow of devastating economic
recession for which the governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) paid a heavy political
price. The final round of the electoral year, held on Nov. 12, featured elections in six states and
Mexico City, with the right-of-center National Action Party (PAN) again registering significant
advances around the nation at the expense of the PRI. Yet, despite the self-serving hoopla of the
three major political parties the PAN, the PRI, and the left-of-center Democratic Revolution Party
(PRD) the clear victor on Nov. 12 (as has been the case throughout 1995) was absenteeism. The
featured race on Nov. 12 was in Michoacan state, where the PRI and the PRD had long predicted a
heated battle for the governor's seat.
In 1988, the PRD's predecessor, led by native-son Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, swept all 13 congressional
districts, both senate seats, and the presidential vote. That victory was unprecedented for an
opposition party. However, in six Michoacan elections since, Cardenas's PRD has been soundly
thrashed by a well-oiled PRI machine that has utilized co-optation, coercion, electoral fraud, and
deep pockets to vanquish its arch-rival. The PRD's honor and perhaps its future were at stake in
the Michoacan gubernatorial race. Indeed, the PRD which is commonly known as the "Party of
the Aztec Sun" had taken only 9% of the cumulative popular vote cast in 13 state elections during
1995. But the political dynamic in Michoacan in 1995 has changed since the ardent head-to-head
confrontations between the PRI and PRD that seemed to flare up every year during the presidency
of Carlos Salinas (1988-94).
For one, the PRI is no longer adamantly opposed to conceding the state to a PRD candidate like
Cristobal Arias, a leader of the "dialogue- minded" wing of his party who has met with President
Ernesto Zedillo on several occasions. Indeed, a PRD victory in Michoacan would have bolstered
Zedillo's credentials as a force for democracy in Mexico's moribund, quasi-one party political
system.
Another new wrinkle in the Michoacan governor's race was the emergence of an attractive PAN
alternative, Felipe Calderon, a fast-rising party official with close ties to party leader Carlos Castillo
Peraza. The end result of these shifting partisan winds was the first truly three-way electoral contest
in modern Mexican political history. Although considered an upstart in Michoacan electoral wars,
the PAN actually has deep roots in the state, having won its first federal deputy's seat here in
the 1940s. Indeed, the PAN has frequently won local elections in politically conservative Zamora,
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which is the fourth largest city in Michoacan. On the other hand, the PAN's sudden emergence as a
statewide force in the 1995 elections is less the result of its own strengths and more the failings of its
opponents.
Many Michoacan citizens admitted voting against the PRI in retaliation for crippling economic
collapse and the popular perception is that a deeply-divided PRD is incapable of governing the
state. Moreover, lopsided PAN victories this year in neighboring Jalisco and Guanajuato states, have
boosted the PAN's allure as a winner. "People here are opposed to the PRI and they see the power
going to the PAN," said former PRI official Arminda Flores. "Besides, they have had bad experiences
with the PRD candidates." Flores said she and many of her neighbors did not vote in the Nov. 12
elections. Such sentiments helped the PAN win nearly 26% of the popular vote. Notwithstanding the
strong showing on Nov. 12, the PAN remains the state's third-ranking political force behind the PRI
and the PRD. Weighing in with a 32% share and victory assured in about half of Michoacan's 113
municipalities, the PRD made it clear to critics that the left-center party still has a political future.
But the failure to win the governorship was a bitter pill to swallow for Cristobal Arias, a two-time
federal senator and the former head of the PRI in Michoacan.
The 1995 campaign represented Arias's second shot at the governor's seat. In 1991, after Arias
claimed fraud had cheated him out of victory, his supporters encamped in front of the government
palace in the state capital of Morelia for a month, preventing the PRI governor-elect from entering
the building. The governor-elect was swiftly replaced by Salinas and an interim governor, also a
member of the PRI, was picked to run the state. Arias was a more vulnerable candidate in 1995. His
selection was the product of a split in the Michoacan PRD that found a voice during a bitterly-fought
primary (the first party primary ever held in Mexico) in which Arias dueled with former PRD federal
senator Roberto Robles Garnica, who was handpicked by Cardenas. Indeed, the selection of Arias
provoked new divisions and even defections in PRD ranks, since a faction of the party had strongly
supported Robles Garnica (see SourceMex, 08/16/95).
Even with the assistance of Cardenas an ex-Michoacan governor who campaigned with Arias
throughout the state, the PRD still failed to capture the state house. Nevertheless, Arias blamed his
loss on the large turnout by PAN sympathizers, rather than on PRD internal strife, charging that
Calderon entered the race to prevent the PRD from winning its first-ever governorship, a triumph
that would have transformed what has become a bipartisan national political dialogue between the
PAN and the PRI into a tripartisan one. Indeed, there was some evidence that the PAN manipulated
the PRD split in some communities to gain a large share of the vote. For example, in places such
as Tiquicheo where the PRD has enjoyed hegemony for the past six years the PAN, abetted by
dissident PRD members, was declared the victor.
Meantime, Victor Manuel Tinoco Rubi, a candidate selected by the PRI national leadership, appears
to have won the Michoacan governorship through the party's time-honored formula of patronage
and violence. Indeed, both the PRD and the PAN released a list of examples in which they accused
the PRI of coopting the vote. For example, the PRD accused the PRI's interim governor, Ausencio
Chavez, of withholding agricultural subsidy checks to farmers until the eve of the election in order
to improve Tinoco's chances. For its part, the PAN issued a list of what it considered 58 politically-
motivated public works projects launched by Chavez throughout the state in the month before the
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election. Spending limits for the parties were set at 28 million nuevo pesos (US$4 million), a sum
only the PRI could afford to spend.
On election day, PRD election-watchers documented PRI officials delivering baskets of chocolate
candy to residents of poor neighborhoods near Morelia. PRD candidates in Turicato and Tiquicheo
were murdered prior to the Nov. 12 elections. Although final tallies were slow in coming in,
Tinoco appears to have won just 38% of the popular vote the lowest ever for a PRI gubernatorial
candidate. Tinoco's small margin of victory was due in part to the heated three-way race and
the high percentage of abstentionism, which reached 42% statewide. Still, the 38% vote received
by Tinoco was a smaller share of the total vote than the percentages received by defeated PRI
candidates in gubernatorial races in Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Baja California states this year.
Other local elections around Mexico on Nov. 12 also featured high absenteeism, often accompanied
by a PAN victory. The PAN scored victories in the mayoral races in major metropolitan areas
throughout Mexico, including Puebla, Oaxaca, Tampico, Matamoros, Culiacan, and Mazatlan. As
a result of this year's elections, the PAN now governs 30% of the Mexican population, including 11
state capitals. However, the latest PAN victories, along with the recent victory in Tuxtla Gutierrez,
Chiapas state, on Oct. 15, have been accompanied by voter abstention rates of 50% or more. In the
Tuxtla Gutierrez race, more than 80% of the registered voters stayed away from the polls, giving
PAN candidate Enoch Araujo a decisive victory (see SourceMex, 11/25/95). Nonetheless, the spread
of PAN victories throughout the country, enhances the party's chances to win control of the federal
congress in 1997 mid-term elections, a step which party leader Castillo Peraza says is necessary for
the PAN to gain the presidency in the federal elections in the year 2000.
In Mexico City, the specter of absenteeism reached historical proportions on Nov. 12 when 1,100
candidates competed for "citizen councilor" slots on advisory boards set up by the capital's 16
delegations or boroughs, in preparation for the direct election of a mayor in 1997. According to
political writer Ricardo Aleman, the PRI sensing defeat by the PAN in the electoral process pushed
through a law requiring all candidacies to be non-partisan. Nonetheless, the parties were deeply
immersed in the electioneering, positing "unaffiliated" proxy candidates, with the PRI's moneybags
showing the way. Despite the strong controversy surrounding the Mexico City election, absenteeism
ranged between 81 and 85%. Of 5.4 million voters, fewer than 900,000 citizens cast ballots on Nov
12. Using words such as "catastrophe," newspapers in the capital described the low turnout as
politically disastrous for Mexico City mayor Oscar Espinosa.
According to political analysts, Espinosa was counting on a large voter turnout, which he saw
as an endorsement of his hard-nosed style of governing. "No one believes in elections, no one
believes the parties, no one believes the government, this is a bad sign," said Cuauhtemoc Abarca,
an independent candidate, who for years has represented the rights of victims of the devastating
earthquake in Mexico City in 1985. Abarca lost by a single vote to a PRI-sponsored rival.
Not all resistance to the Mexico City election was passive. In the dirt-poor Ixtapalapa delegation,
members of the Francisco Villa Popular Front, which opposes electoral participation, violently
shut down polling places. Since the record turn-out of 77% in August 1994, which gave the PRI's
Ernesto Zedillo a landslide presidential victory, opposition to electoral participation has grown
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more outspoken around the country. For example, in the Chiapas elections on Oct. 15, the Zapatista
National Liberation Army (EZLN) called on its supporters to boycott local elections, handing the PRI
100% of the vote in some communities.
"The system of parties has taken on a lot of water in recent months," said political analyst
Luis Hernandez Navarro in a column in La Jornada. Hernandez contrasts the successes of the
nonpartisan "Civil Society," with depleted trust in the political parties. He cited such successful
thrusts as the campaign against government and banking credit policies by the nonpartisan debtors
union El Barzon and the EZLN's plebiscite, which attracted 1.3 million participants. Another
example, he said was the growing autonomy movement among indigenous communities throughout
Mexico.
In a column published in La Jornada, PRD federal deputy Marco Rascon said the electoral path
has lost relevance because the majority of the citizens in Mexico do not believe that the mere act of
voting can bring about the social and economic changes needed in Mexico. "People do not believe
that voting for a mayor can halt the economic disasters that have befallen Mexico this year," he said.
Rascon, who outraged his colleagues in Congress by wearing a mask of US President Bill Clinton on
the floor of the Chamber of Deputies, believes that Mexico's economic policies are now crafted in
Washington. Therefore, Rascon has suggested that the US presidential race between Republicans
and Democrats in November 1996 will be the most significant election facing Mexicans in the near
future.
-- End --
